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Abstract 
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result in sharp contrast to the recent findings of Liu and Turnovsky (2005). In addition, we 
solve for the intertemporal path of the economy to investigate its response to demographic 
shocks, specifically, to permanent changes in the birth and death rates. 
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1 Introduction
Social scientists have long suggested that the drive for social position, or status, is a crucial
motivation in economic decision making. In modern economics this idea has received gen-
eral analytical treatments by authors such as Layard (1980) and Frank (1985, 1997), while
empirical support for the importance of social position for economic well-being is found, for
example, in the research of Easterlin (1974, 1995) and Oswald (1997).
Since the 1990s, this concept has also attracted the attention of macroeconomists, who
have explored the implications of a preference for status on dynamic, aggregate behav-
ior. Researchers focusing on the effects of status preference for macroeconomic equilib-
rium and growth include Rauscher (1997), Grossmann (1998), Fisher and Hof (2000), Dupor
and Liu (2003), and Liu and Turnovsky (2005). These researchers assume that the quest for
status—frequently referred to in this context as “Keeping-up-with-the Joneses”—is reflected
in reduced-form specifications of individual preferences that depend on a benchmark level
of consumption, such as the average, or aggregate, level of consumption in an economy.1
Among the questions these authors consider is whether, and under what circumstances, sta-
tus preferences of this type cause agents to “over-consume” and work “too hard”, compared
to a hypothetical social optimum. In other words, does a welfare-reducing “rat race” result if
individuals compare their own consumption to some economy-wide, benchmark level? For
example, Liu and Turnovsky (2005), employing a standard representative agent (RA) setting,
show that the long-run effects of consumption externalities depend on whether work effort
is an endogenous variable: if, on the one hand, employment is fixed, then the steady state of
the economy is independent of benchmark consumption, while, on the other, if work effort
is endogenous, then consumption externalities lead to excessive long-run consumption and
capital accumulation, as well as too much employment.2
Consumption externalities have also been used by authors such as Abel (1990) and Galı´
(1994), to study asset pricing, while Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) employ the “Catching-up-
1Another branch of themacroeconomic literature in this area assumes that social standing depends on relative
wealth, rather than on relative consumption. See, for example, the recent work of Corneo and Jeanne (1997,
2001a, b), Futagami and Shibata (1998), Fisher (2004), Van Long and Shimomura (2004a, b), and Fisher and Hof
(2005a, b).
2A similar result is found in Dupor and Liu (2003) and is attributable to the fact that consumption externalities
raise the marginal rate of substitution for leisure above its Pareto optimal level.
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with-the-Joneses” version of status preferences in a simple business cycle model.3 More
recently, this literature has been extended—particularly in terms of an analysis of the econ-
omy’s transitional dynamics—by Alverez-Cuadrado et al. (2004), and Turnovsky and Mon-
teiro (2007), who incorporate a time non-separable preference structure based on the funda-
mental work of Ryder and Heal (1973) on habit formation.4
While these studies have contributed many insights to our understanding of the aggre-
gate implications of status preferences, the RA framework employed by all these researchers
is, nevertheless, restrictive: since all agents are identical, all differences between them are
eliminated in the symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium. In other words, no one “wins” the
rat race in this context. In view of the fact, however, that status inherently concerns economic
differences among individuals, it is important, in our view, to develop a macroeconomic
model of social position in which these differences persist over time. Moreover, some crucial
effects of consumption externalities might be lost in a symmetric economic equilibrium.
A natural starting point to model agent heterogeneity is the overlapping generations
(OLG) framework in which individuals differ in age and, thus, in their consumption levels
and asset holdings. In particular, the economic positions of agents differ from the corre-
sponding economy-wide averages in this setting. To our knowledge, only the recent study
of Abel (2005), who uses a discrete-time Diamond (1965) approach, considers the effects of
benchmark consumption in an OLG setting.5 In contrast, we employ the Blanchard (1985)-
Yaari (1965) framework in our model of status preference. An important advantage of the
Blanchard-Yaari (BY) approach is that it allows us to calculate detailed dynamic responses
to macroeconomic disturbances.
The BY framework has been employed to study a wide variety of public policy and ag-
3Under the Catching-up-with-the-Joneses specification, which is also employed by Abel (1990), the bench-
mark level of consumption is weighted average of past consumption. In this context Ljungqvist and Uhlig
(2000) show that the optimal consumption tax is countercyclical. In our model, the benchmark is the current
consumption of all surviving generations.
4Both Alverez-Cuadrado et al. (2004), and Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) employ an endogenous growth
framework. Moreover, Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) show that the results of Liu and Turnovsky (2005), re-
garding the conditions under which consumption externalities distort the economy’s long run, extend to the
time non-separable preference setting.
5Abel (2005) derives the balanced-growth optimal capital tax and transfer policy.
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gregate macroeconomic shocks in both closed and open economy contexts.6 Of immediate
interest for our purposes are the recent applications of Heijdra and Ligthart (2006) and Bet-
tendorf and Heijdra (2006), who study the dynamic implications of various demographic
shocks. While Heijdra and Ligthart (2006) conduct their analysis in a general macroeco-
nomic context with an endogenous employment decision, Bettendorf and Heijdra (2006)
model the effects of demographic change on the pension system of an open economy that
consumes and produces traded and non-traded goods. In this paper we follow these authors
inmodeling the impact of demographic shocks, focusing on the adjustment of aggregate con-
sumption and the capital stock in our model of consumption externalities.7 Specifically, we
consider the effects of a decline in the birth rate—a “baby bust”—and a fall in the mortality
rate—a “longevity boost”. In addition, we calculate the implications of an increase in the
parameter determining the degree, or intensity, of status preference. Regarding the latter, a
key finding of the paper is that the result of Liu and Turnovsky (2005)—that the long-run
equilibrium is independent of consumption externalities if employment is fixed—does not
hold in the BY framework. We show, in fact, that negative consumption externalities lower
both aggregate consumption and the capital stock in the long run, even though labor is ex-
ogenously supplied in our model.
The order of material in the remainder of the paper is as follows: the next section, section
2, analyzes the household and firm sectors. The OLG equilibrium is derived in section 3,
which includes a phase diagram describing the macroeconomic dynamics. In section 4 we
use our model to conduct macroeconomic experiments: i) an increase in the relative con-
sumption parameter, ii) a decline in the birth rate, and iii) a fall in the mortality rate. Our
analytical results regarding the economy’s comparative dynamics are also supplemented in
section 4 by numerical simulations. Section 5 briefly outlines our conclusions and sugges-
tions for future work. Finally, a mathematical appendix contains some results used in the
main text.
6In the context of tax and environmental policy see, for example, Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998). Represen-
tative applications of the BY framework in the open economy context include Frenkel and Razin (1986), Buiter
(1987), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
7As in Heijdra and Ligthart (2006) and Bettendorf andHeijdra (2006), the demographic disturbances modeled
in this paper are time-dependent, but cohort independent. For research that considers the implications of more
realistic, cohort-specific demographic shocks, see the recent work of Heijdra and Romp (2006a, b).
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2 The Macroeconomy
2.1 Households
We begin this section with a description of household preferences and then proceed to an
analysis of their intertemporal choices and constraints. As indicated above, we analyze an
economy in which individuals of particular “vintages” care about their own consumption
compared to the average prevailing level of consumption across generations. In other words,
while young and old differ, they all aspire to the same level of consumption. For simplicity,
we assume that agents supply a fixed amount of labor. The lifetime utility at time t of an
agent born at time v (with v ≤ t) is then given by:
Λ (v, t) =
∫
∞
t
U [c¯ (v, τ) , c (τ)] e(ρ+β)(t−τ)dτ, (1)
where c¯ (v, τ) is the individual level of consumption, c (τ) is the economy-wide level of
consumption, ρ is the rate of time preference, and β is the instantaneous death probability.
For simplicity, we use the following logarithmic felicity function:
U [·] ≡ ln x¯ (v, τ) , (2)
where the subfelicity function x¯ (v, τ) is defined as follows:
x¯ (v, τ) ≡
c¯ (v, τ)− αc (τ)
1− α
, α < 1. (3)
The key parameter α in (3) scales the importance of relative consumption. We allow α to
take positive and negative values: if α > 0 then agents are “jealous” of the consumption
of others, while if α < 0, then agents “admire” the consumption of others. Observe, in
addition, that the specification of x¯ (v, τ) satisfies the condition stated in Liu and Turnovsky
(2005), Proposition 3, for consumption externalities to have no effect on economic outcomes
in the context of the RA, fixed employment framework. Thus, our use of (3) does not bias
our results in favor of consumption externalities.
Agents receive interest income on their real asset holdings and real wage income from
their exogenous labor supply. Their flow budget identity corresponds to:
˙¯a (v, τ) = [r (τ) + β] a¯ (v, τ) + w (τ)− c¯ (v, τ) , (4)
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where a¯ (v, τ) is real financial wealth, r (τ) + β is the annuity rate of interest, and w (τ) is
the (age-independent) wage rate. Note that while each household supplies a single unit of
labor, the (real) wage rate w (τ) is, in general, not constant over time.
As indicated above, we consider the implications of consumption externalities and de-
mographic shocks in the overlapping generations framework, using an analytical solution
of the model as well as numerical results. Applying standard methods, the following indi-
vidual optimality condition is obtained for the time profile of subfelicity:
˙¯x (v, τ)
x¯ (v, τ)
= r (τ)− ρ. (5)
To solve for the household’s intertemporal budget constraint, we integrate the household
budget identities, subject to a¯ (v, t) taken as given, and obtain:
lim
τ→∞
a¯ (v, τ) e−R(t,τ) − a¯ (v, t) =
∫
∞
t
w (τ) e−R(t,τ)dτ −
∫
∞
t
c¯ (v, τ) e−R(t,τ)dτ, (6)
where R (t, τ) is the annuity interest factor corresponding to:
R (t, τ) ≡
∫ τ
t
[r (s) + β] ds. (7)
Imposing the NPG condition, equal to limt→∞ a¯ (v, τ) e−R(t,τ) = 0, and using (3), equation (6)
simplifies to:
∫
∞
t
[(1− α) x¯ (v, τ) + αc (τ)] e−R(t,τ)dτ = a¯ (v, t) + h (t) , (8)
where h (t) is age-independent human wealth:
h (t) =
∫
∞
t
w (τ) e−R(t,τ)dτ. (9)
According to (8), the present discounted value of a weighted average of individual subfelic-
ity and economy-wide per capita consumption equals the sum of the individual’s financial
and human wealth. Using (5), we next obtain an expression for c¯ (v, t) in terms of c(t) that is
useful in determining the aggregate Euler equation. Solving (5) and noting (7) we find:
x¯ (v, τ) = x¯ (v, t) eR(t,τ)−(ρ+β)(τ−t), τ ≥ t, (10)
which implies that the intertemporal budget constraint (8) can be written as:
(1− α) x¯ (v, t) + α (ρ + β) Γ (t) = (ρ + β) [a¯ (v, t) + h (t)] , (11)
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where the term Γ (t) is defined as:
Γ (t) ≡
∫
∞
t
c (τ) e−R(t,τ)dτ. (12)
Substituting the expression (1− α) x¯ (v, t) = c¯ (v, t) − αc (t) from equation (3) into the in-
tertemporal household budget constraint (11), we obtain the following relationship between
individual, c¯ (v, t), and average, c (t), consumption:
c¯ (v, t) = (ρ + β)
[
a¯ (v, t) + h (t)
]
+ α
[
c (t)− (ρ + β) Γ (t)
]
. (13)
In the absence of a consumption externality (α = 0), individuals condition their consumption
solely on their total wealth, with ρ + β representing the propensity to consume out of total
wealth. With a non-zero consumption externality, however, individual consumption is also
directly affected by the future time path of economy-wide, per capita consumption.8
2.2 Firms
We next turn to the firm sector of economy, which is kept as simple as possible in order to
focus on the implications of consumption externalities in the OLG framework.9 The pro-
duction sector is characterized by a large number of firms that produce an identical good
under conditions of perfect competition. Net10 output, Y(t), is produced according to a
Cobb-Douglas technology with labor, L(t), and physical capital, K(t), as homogeneous fac-
tor inputs that are rented from households:
Y(t) = F [K(t), L(t)] = Z0K
εL1−ε, y (t) = Z0k (t)
ε , 0 < ε < 1, (14)
where y (t) ≡ Y (t) /L (t) is per-capita output, k (t) ≡ K (t) /L (t) is the capital-labor ra-
tio, and Z0 is exogenous total factor productivity. The production function possesses the
8We find from (12) that Γ˙ (t) = [r (t) + β] Γ (t)− c (t). Obviously, in the steady-state, we have that Γ˙ (t) = 0
so that Γ = c/ (r + β). Using this result in the steady-state version of (13) yields:
c¯ (u) = (ρ + β) [a¯ (u) + h] + α
r− ρ
r + β
c,
where u ≡ t − v is the agent’s age. Since, r > ρ (see below), provided α 6= 0, aggregate consumption also
influences individuals in the steady state.
9Similar to Liu and Turnovsky (2005), the present model can be extended to incorporate production as well
as consumption externalities. We leave this task for future work.
10In other words, Y(t) is measured taking into account the physical depreciation of the capital stock.
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standard features of positive but diminishing marginal products in both factors. The repre-
sentative firm maximizes its net present (or equity) value:
V(t) =
∫
∞
t
[
[Y(τ)− w(τ)L(τ)] + δK(τ)− I(τ)
]
exp
[
−
∫ τ
t
r(s)ds
]
dτ, (15)
with respect to labor and capital subject to the production function (14) and the capital ac-
cumulation constraint, K˙(t) = I(t) − δK(t), where I(t) denotes gross investment, w(t) is
the economy-wide real wage, and δ is the constant rate of physical depreciation of capital.
By assumption, there are no adjustment costs associated with investment. The first-order
conditions for the firm imply that the marginal productivity of labor and capital equal the
producer costs of these factors:
FK [k(t), 1] = εy(t)/k(t) = r (t) , (16)
FL [k(t), 1] = (1− ε)y(t) = w(t). (17)
Substituting the relationships (16)–(17) in (15) and using the CRS property of F [K(t), L(t)],
we can show, in addition, that the market value of the firm equals the replacement value of
its capital stock, i.e., V(t) = K(t).11
3 Aggregation and Macroeconomic Equilibrium
3.1 Aggregation
In this part of the paper we derive the aggregate relationships of the household sector and
state the overall OLGmacroeconomic equilibrium. We allow for constant population growth
n and distinguish between the birth rate, η, and the death rate, β, so that n ≡ η − β. The
relative cohort weights evolve, in turn, according to:
l (v, t) ≡
L (v, t)
L (t)
= ηeη(v−t), t ≥ v. (18)
This expression then permits us to calculate the per-capita average value of consumption
that represents the benchmark for the individual:
c (t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) c¯ (v, t) dv. (19)
11It is straightforward to incorporate government consumption, taxes, and public debt into this framework. A
task for future work is an analysis of the role of taxes and fiscal deficits in smoothing the economy’s adjustment
to demographic shocks.
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To derive the aggregate Euler equation, we differentiate (19) with respect to time to calculate
the expression for c˙(t):
c˙ (t) ≡ l (t, t) c¯ (t, t) +
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) ˙¯c (v, t) dv +
∫ t
−∞
l˙ (v, t) c¯ (v, t) dv
= ηc¯ (t, t) +
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) ˙¯c (v, t) dv− η
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) c¯ (v, t) dv
=
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) ˙¯c (v, t) dv− η [c (t)− c¯ (t, t)] , (20)
where we have substituted for (18)–(19) to obtain (20). Since ˙¯c (v, t) ≡ (1− α) ˙¯x (v, t) + αc˙ (t)
from (3), the first term on the right-hand side of (20) is simplified in the following way:
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) ˙¯c (v, t) dv = (1− α)
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) ˙¯x (v, t) dv + α
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) c˙ (t) dv
= (1− α) [r (t)− ρ]
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) x¯ (v, t) dv + αc˙ (t)
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) dv
= (1− α) [r (t)− ρ] x (t) + αc˙ (t) , (21)
where we substitute for (5) to obtain the second equality of (21). The third equality of (21)
follows from the definition of x(t) and the fact that cohort weights sum-up to unity. Thus,
substitution of (21) into (20) and noting that x (t) = c (t) holds in aggregate, yields the
following economy-wide differential equation for consumption:
c˙ (t) = [r (t)− ρ] c(t)−
η
1− α
· [c (t)− c¯ (t, t)] . (22)
Observe that the consumption externality—as parameterized by α—affects themagnitude of
the second term in (22), known as the intergenerational turnover term, where c (t)− c¯ (t, t)
is the difference between average consumption and the consumption of new agents. This
correction term, characteristic of the BY framework, takes into account the fact that older co-
horts, enjoying greater levels of consumption due to greater stocks of wealth, are succeeded
by new individuals, who start life without financial assets. As a consequence, the growth
of consumption for the economy as a whole is less than the growth of consumption for each
individual, even though each individual faces the same interest rate. Below, we detail impli-
cations of the consumption externality for the OLG steady-state. It remains to derive a more
convenient expression for c (t)− c¯ (t, t). Using (13) we find:
c (t) = (ρ + β) [a (t) + h (t)] + α [c (t)− (ρ + β) Γ (t)] , (23)
c¯ (t, t) = (ρ + β) h (t) + α [c (t)− (ρ + β) Γ (t)] , (24)
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where a¯ (t, t) = 0, since new cohorts are born with no financial wealth. Combining (23)-(24),
we obtain [c (t)− c¯ (t, t)] = (ρ + β) a (t), which permits us to rewrite (22) as:
c˙ (t)
c (t)
= r (t)− ρ−
η (ρ + β)
1− α
·
a (t)
c (t)
. (25)
Using the cohort weights (18), aggregate financial assets, equal to a (t) ≡
∫ t
−∞ l (v, t) a¯ (v, t) dv,
evolve according to:
a˙ (t) ≡ l (t, t) a¯ (t, t) +
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t) ˙¯a (v, t) dv +
∫ t
−∞
l˙ (v, t) a¯ (v, t) dv
=
∫ t
−∞
l (v, t)
[
[r (t) + β− η] a¯ (v, t) + w (t)− c¯ (v, t)
]
dv
= [r (t)− n] a (t) + w (t)− c (t) , (26)
where, to obtain the second and third equalities in (26), we substitute, respectively, for the
household’s flow budget identity (4) and use the fact that n ≡ η − β.
3.2 Macroeconomic equilibrium
Having derived the relationships describing aggregate household behavior and using our
previous descriptions of the firm sector, we are in a position to state the (per-capita) OLG
macroeconomic equilibrium, which is given by:12
c˙ (t)
c (t)
= r (t)− ρ−
η(ρ + β)
1− α
·
k (t)
c (t)
, (27)
k˙ (t) = y(t)− c (t)− (η − β) k (t) , (28)
r (t) = ε
y(t)
k(t)
, w(t) = (1− ε)y(t), (29)
y (t) = Z0k (t)
ε , 0 < ε < 1. (30)
The dynamics of aggregate consumption and capital are governed by (27)–(28), with k(t) the
predetermined and c (t) the “jump” variable that responds to new information. The accu-
mulation equation (28) for physical capital is obtained by letting k(t) ≡ a(t), since physical
capital is the only form of savings, and using the optimality conditions for the firm sector
12The standard RA model is recovered by setting η = 0 and β = −n in (27)-(28). Intuitively, in the RA case
there are no new disconnected agents, and population growth shows up in the form of a negative β, i.e. an
increase in the size of the dynastic family.
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stated in (29). Observe, furthermore, that (28) is stated in terms of the demographic vari-
ables, since n ≡ η − β. Equation (30) restates the per-capita production function.
We close this section with a description of the phase diagram of our OLG model. It
follows from (27)–(28), that the c˙ (t) = 0 and k˙ (t) = 0 are given by:
c (t) =
η (ρ + β)
ρ (1− α)
·
k (t)
(k (t) /kra)ε−1 − 1
≡ Φ (k (t)) , (31)
c (t) = Z0k (t)
ε − (η − β) k (t) , (32)
where kra = (εZ0/ρ)
1/(1−ε) is the long-run value of the capital stock in the standard RA
framework and where we have substituted for y (t) = Z0k (t)
ε in (32). The corresponding
slopes of these relationships equal:
dc (t)
dk (t)
∣∣∣∣
c˙(t)=0
=
Φ (k (t))
k (t)
[
1+
(1− ε) (k (t) /kra)ε−1
(k (t) /kra)ε−1 − 1
]
> 0, for 0 ≤ k (t) ≤ kra,
dc (t)
dk (t)
∣∣∣∣
k˙(t)=0
= εZ0k (t)
ε−1 − (η − β) R 0, as εZ0k (t)ε−1 R η − β,
and are illustrated in Figure 1. In Figure 1 the (unique) intersection of the c˙ (t) = 0 and
k˙ (t) = 0 isoclines determines the (initial) long-run values, kby and cby, of the capital stock
and consumption, where “by” denotes the Blanchard-Yaari framework. Note in Figure 1 that
we also illustrate the corresponding long-run values of capital and consumption in the RA
setting, which depicts the standard result that the long-run values of the capital stock and
consumption in the RA framework exceed their BY counterparts, kkr > kby and ckr > cby
(although both fall short of the Golden-Rule values, kgr and cgr).13 Furthermore, observe
that while the k˙ (t) = 0 locus is independent of preferences—including the agent’s attitude
toward status—the c˙ (t) = 0 locus is a function, among others, of the relative consumption
parameter α.14 In contrast, both the c˙ (t) = 0 and k˙ (t) = 0 isoclines are functions of the
demographic parameters η (the birth rate) and β (the death rate). We employ log-linearized
versions of this diagram in section 5 to analyze the short and long-run effects of status pref-
erence and demographic disturbances.
13Figure 1 is drawn under the (reasonable) assumption that ρ > n. In the OLG model this assumption is not
necessary, i.e. a saddle-point stable equilibrium materializes to the right of kgr if ρ < n (dynamic inefficiency).
In contrast, in the RA model, ρ < n is a necessary condition for saddle-point stability.
14If, however, labor supply is endogenous, then the k˙ (t) = 0 isocline depends on preferences.
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4 Log-Linearization and Model Solution
4.1 Log-Linearization
In order to calculate the solution of the model, we must linearize the macroeconomic equi-
librium derived above in (27)–(30), employing the following notation: y˜(t) ≡ dy(t)/y,
k˜(t) ≡ dk(t)/k, c˜(t) ≡ dc(t)/c, r˜(t) ≡ dr(t)/r, w˜(t) ≡ dw(t)/w, η˜ ≡ dη/η, β˜ ≡ dβ/β,
α˜ ≡ dα/ (1− α), ˙˜k(t) ≡ dk˙ (t) /k, and ˙˜c(t) ≡ dc˙ (t) /c. The log-linearized equilibrium then
corresponds to:
˙˜c(t) = (r− ρ)
[
c˜(t)− k˜(t)− α˜− η˜ −
β
ρ + β
β˜
]
+ r r˜(t), (33)
˙˜k(t) =
r
ε
[y˜(t)−ωC c˜(t)]− n k˜ (t)− η η˜ + β β˜, (34)
y˜(t) = w˜(t), y˜(t)− k˜(t) = r˜(t), y˜(t) = ε k˜(t), (35)
where n ≡ η − β, ωC ≡ c/y and ωA ≡ rk/y = ε.
4.2 Model Solution
Solving equations (33)–(34), the dynamic system for the capital stock and consumption can
be written as follows:
 ˙˜c(t)
˙˜k(t)

 = ∆

 c˜(t)
k˜(t)

−

 γc
γk

 , (36)
where the Jacobian matrix and the vector of (time invariant) exogenous shocks are given,
respectively, by:15
∆ ≡

 δ11 δ12
δ21 δ22

 ≡

 r− ρ −r (1− ε)− (r− ρ)
−
rωC
ε
r− n

 , (37)

 γc
γk

 ≡

 (r− ρ)
[
α˜ + η˜ + βρ+β β˜
]
ηη˜ − ββ˜

 . (38)
15Note that both the birth and death rates enter negatively in the ˙˜c(t) equation. In contrast, while the birth
rate η is a negative shift parameter in the ˙˜k(t) equation, the death rate β enters positively.
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The system described by (36) is saddle-point stable, with det∆ < 0 and the corresponding
eigenvalues given by −λ1 < 0 and λ2 > 0. Evaluating the dynamic system in steady-
state equilibrium, it is straightforward to calculate the long-run effects of permanent status
preference and demographic shocks on consumption and physical capital:
 c˜(∞)
k˜(∞)

 = ∆−1

 γc
γk

 (39)
The next step in analyzing the adjustment of the economy is to compute the initial re-
sponse of consumption, c˜(0). To do so, we calculate the Laplace transform of (36), assuming
that physical capital evolves from an initial predetermined stock, k˜ (0) = 0. The specific
procedure is outlined in the appendix and yields the following (equivalent) expressions for
c˜(0):
c˜(0) = L{γc,λ2}+
δ12
λ2 − δ22
L{γk,λ2} = L{γc,λ2}+
λ2 − δ11
δ21
L{γk,λ2}, (40)
where L{γi, s} ≡
∫
∞
0 γi (t) e
−stdt is the Laplace transform of the time path for γi (t). Finally,
the transitional solution paths for consumption and capital correspond to:
 c˜ (t)
k˜ (t)

 =

 c˜(0)
0

 e−λ1t +

 c˜(∞)
k˜(∞)

 [1− e−λ1t] , (41)
where, again, the solution method is described in the appendix, and where we have used the
fact that the Laplace transform of the shock terms take the form L{γi, s} = γi/s for i = c, k,
since, as indicated, we consider only unanticipated, permanent, time-invariant disturbances
to the status preference and demography parameters. Below, we also illustrate the dynamic
effects on post-shock newborn agents. It follows from the discussion regarding equation (25)
that newborn consumption can be written as c¯ (t, t) = c (t)− (ρ + β) k (t). Log-linearizing
this expression, we obtain:
˜¯c (t, t) =
c
c¯ (0)
c˜ (t)−
k
c¯ (0)
[
(ρ + β) k˜ (t) + β β˜
]
, (42)
where c, c¯ (0), and k are the initial steady-state values for, respectively, per-capita consump-
tion, newborn consumption, and the per-capita capital stock.
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5 Comparative Dynamics
Employing the results stated in the previous section, we now analyze the dynamic response
of aggregate consumption and physical capital to status preference, birth rate, and mortality
rate disturbances. We illustrate the transitional adjustment of the economy by using phase
diagrams based on the dynamic system (36) and supplement these findings with numerical
simulations of the transitional paths given in (41). We initially set the benchmark parameters
for this exercise as follows:16
α = 0.0, β = 0.005, η = 0.01, ε = 0.2, r = 0.05, Z0 = 1.
5.1 Change in the Status Parameter
Letting α˜ > 0 and η˜ = β˜ = 0 in (39), the long-run effect of an increase in the parameter
describing the importance of status equals:
c˜(∞) = (r− ρ) (r− n) ·
α˜
det∆
< 0, k˜(∞) = (r− ρ)
rωC
ε
·
α˜
det∆
< 0, (43)
where det∆ < 0 and r > n. According to (43), a rise in α lowers both the level of con-
sumption and the physical capital stock in the steady-state equilibrium. This result stands
in sharp contrast to the findings of Liu and Turnovsky (2005) in the context of the RA model
with exogenous employment. There, (see Proposition 1) the steady state of the economy
was independent of consumption externalities. Our OLG relationships in (43) show, on the
other hand, that an increase in the preference weight for relative consumption permanently
lowers economic activity, even if work effort is given, as it is in our model.17 A change in
α leads to an adjustment in the long-run equilibrium because it affects the importance of
the generational turnover term in the Euler equation given above in (27). Higher values of
α, corresponding to greater degrees of jealousy, increase the importance of the generational
turnover effect, which tends to lower the long-run values of consumption and physical cap-
ital.
16Our initial benchmark parameterization implies a capital-output ratio of 4, a value not too far from empirical
estimations, since y represents net output. We use the rate of time preference as a calibration parameter and
obtain ρ = 0.0478. The consumption share is ωC = 0.98 and the characteristic roots are −λ1 = −0.080 and
λ2 = 0.127.
17Clearly, if r = ρ, our results in (43) collapse to the RA case.
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Evaluating either expression in (40) for α˜ > 0 and η˜ = β˜ = 0, we calculate the initial
jump in consumption:
c˜(0) =
r− ρ
λ2
· α˜ > 0, (44)
which is unambiguously positive. The adjustment of consumption and the capital stock can
be illustrated in the phase diagram in Figure 2(a). The rise in α causes the ˙˜c (t) = 0 isocline
to shift to the left, while the ˙˜k (t) = 0 locus is unaffected by this exogenous disturbance.
This leads to a shift in the long-run equilibrium from E0 to E1, which corresponds, as a
indicated, to a decline on c˜(∞) and k˜(∞). The initial increase in consumption is depicted by
the jump in the dynamic system from point E0 to point A in Figure 2(a), with (c˜ (t) , k˜ (t))
proceeding down the (new) saddle path SP from point A to point E1. The phase diagram
analysis is confirmed by the numerical simulation of the adjustment paths of the model,
which is calculated for an increase in α from its benchmark value of 0 to 0.5. In other words,
we simulate an increase in jealousy. The numerical simulations illustrated in Figures 2(c)-
(d) illustrate the initial jump as well as the long-run decline in consumption, along with the
gradual decumulation of physical capital. Finally, in Figure 2(b) we illustrate the effects on
newborn consumption, ˜¯c (t, t), as given in (42) above. Interestingly, despite the fact that per
capita consumption falls in the long run, consumption by newborns remains above its initial
steady-state value, both during transition and in the new steady state.
5.2 Fall in the Birth Rate
Here, we set η˜ < 0 and α˜ = β˜ = 0 in (39), with the long-run multipliers corresponding to:
c˜(∞) =
[
(r− ρ) (r + β) + ηr (1− ε)
]
·
η˜
det∆
> 0, (45)
k˜(∞) = (r− ρ)
[ rωC
ε
+ η
]
·
η˜
det∆
> 0. (46)
Clearly, the results in (45)-(46) imply that a permanent drop in the birth rate results in a
greater level of consumption and physical capital. As indicated above, this demographic
shock affects both the ˙˜c (t) = 0 and the ˙˜k (t) = 0 isoclines of the phase diagram in Figure
3(a), such that the former isocline shifts to the right, while the latter locus shifts to the left,
responses that result in a new steady-state equilibrium at point E1, corresponding to higher
values of c˜(∞) and k˜(∞).
15
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Figure 2: Increase in α from 0 to 0.5
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For this shock the initial jump in consumption, employing (40), equals:
c˜(0) =
[
(r− ρ) (λ2 + β)− ηr (1− ε)
λ2 − (r− n)
]
·
η˜
λ2
, (47)
which is ambiguous in sign. In Figure 3(a) we illustrate the case in which c˜(0) rises to point
A on the new stable saddle path SP. Along SP, both consumption the capital stock increase
to the new, long-run equilibrium. In the numerical simulation of this shock—which depicts
the dynamic response to a fall in the birth rate η (from 1% to 0.5% per annum) and in Fig-
ures 3(c)-(d)—the initial jump in consumption is positive, with the paths of consumption
and the capital stock tracking those derived from our analytical model. In Figure 3(b), the
consumption by newborns rises monotonically. In sum, a fall the birth rate η has dynamic
implications that are opposite from an increase in the relative consumption parameter α, a
result that follows from the fact that a lower birth rate implies that the generational turnover
effect of the BY framework is less important. Equally, however, our previous results have
shown that if agents care strongly about relative consumption (α close to unity), then the
generational turnover effect is crucial, even if the economy experiences a declining birth
rate.
5.3 Decline in the Mortality Rate
To determine the steady-state implications of a permanent decline in the mortality rate, we
set β˜ < 0 and α˜ = η˜ = 0 in (39) and compute the following long-run multipliers, given by:
c˜(∞) =
[
(r− ρ) (r− n)− (ρ + β) [r (1− ε) + r− ρ]
]
·
β
ρ + β
·
β˜
det∆
, (48)
k˜(∞) = (r− ρ)
[ rωC
ε
− (ρ + β)
]
·
β
ρ + β
·
β˜
det∆
> 0. (49)
Whilst the effect on consumption is ambiguous in sign, the capital stock increases as a result
of a longevity boost provided α is not too negative, i.e. admiration is not too strong.18 The
initial jump in consumption, equal to:
c˜(0) = −
β˜
λ2
β
ρ + β
[
− (r− ρ) +
(ρ + β) [r (1− ε) + (r− ρ)]
λ2 − (r− n)
]
, (50)
18The term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (49) is positive. Note first that rωC/ε = c/k. It follows
from, respectively, (9) and (23) that steady-state human wealth and per capita consumption:
h =
(1− ε) y
r + β
> 0, c = (ρ + β)
k + h
1− γ
,
where γ ≡ α (r− ρ) / (r + β) < 1. Provided α is not too negative, it follows that c/k > ρ + β.
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Figure 3: Decrease in η from 1% to 0.5% per annum
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can be either positive or negative. The long-run ambiguity is due to the fact that both iso-
clines in the phase diagram in Figure 4(a) shift to the right subsequent to a fall in the mor-
tality rate. In Figure 4(a) we illustrate the plausible case in which the rightward shift in the
˙˜c (t) = 0 isocline dominates the rightward shift in the ˙˜k(t) = 0 locus, which results in a new
equilibrium at point E1 with lower long-run consumption c˜(∞), but higher physical capital
k˜(∞). The latter response is quite intuitive, since the fall in the mortality encourages agents,
since they live longer, to accumulate more assets. Turning to our numerical simulations for
the case in which β falls (from 0.5% to 0.1% per annum), we show in Figure 4(c) that con-
sumption initially declines before partially recovering in the transition to the steady state, a
response also illustrated in the phase diagram. Figure 4(b) shows that newborn consumption
falls as a result of the longevity boost.
6 Conclusions and Extensions
The goal of this paper is to merge two recent strands in the macroeconomic literature: the
OLG framework and the work that seeks to investigate the implications of the quest for
status. Our principle motivation in adopting the OLG approach with demographic variables
is to develop a model of consumption externalities in which differences between individuals
do not disappear in equilibrium. In other words, we wish to investigate the properties of
a model in which agents are not “too equal”, as they are in the RA setting. Employing
the BY version of the basic OLG framework, we are able to overturn the recent result of
Liu and Turnovsky (2005) regarding the long-run implications of consumption externalities:
the latter permanently affect the steady state of the economy, even if employment is fixed.
Indeed, if agents as a whole become more “jealous”, then the rat race in our model leads to
a long-run decline in aggregate consumption and the capital stock.
Rather than reiterating the rest of our findings, let us briefly indicate some possible ex-
tensions of this model. One is to introduce distortionary taxation with endogenous labor
supply and consider the resulting welfare implications in a setting with consumption exter-
nalities. The recent work of Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) in calculating welfare effects in an
OLG framework would be of assistance in this task. Furthermore, extending the model to
an open economy context would permit us to consider the effects of a preference for relative
19
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Figure 4: Decrease in β from 0.5% to 0.1% per annum
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consumption on, for example, the current account dynamics. Finally, incorporating pro-
duction externalities as well as consumption externalities would allow us to compare and
contrast the implications of these two, distinct distortions in an OLG setting.
Appendix
Derivation of the Expression for c˜(0)
Taking the Laplace transform of (36) and imposing k˜ (0) = 0, we obtain:
Λ(s)

 L{c˜, s}
L{k˜, s}

 =

 c˜(0)−L{γc, s}
−L{γk, s}

 , (A.1)
where Λ(s) ≡ sI− ∆, such that characteristic roots of ∆ are −λ1 < 0 (stable) and λ2 > 0
(unstable). We next state the following lemma regarding the solutions to the characteristic
polynomial, Ψ (s) ≡ detΛ(s).
Lemma A.1 The characteristic roots −λ1 and λ2 are solutions to Ψ(s) = 0. Since the model
is saddle-point stable (|∆| < 0), we find: (i) λ2 > δ22 ≡ r− n;
Proof: Clearly, Ψ(0) = |∆| < 0 (by saddle-point stability) and Ψ(λ2) = 0 (by definition). It
follows that λ2 > δ22 ⇐⇒ Ψ(δ22) < 0. By substitution we find that Ψ(δ22) = −δ12δ21 < 0. 
By pre-multiplying both sides of (A.1) by Λ(s)−1 ≡ adjΛ(s)/[(s + λ1)(s−λ2)]we obtain
the following expression in Laplace transforms
(s + λ1)

 L{c˜, s}
L{k˜, s}

 = 1
s− λ2
adjΛ(s)

 c˜(0)−L{γc, s}
−L{γk, s}

 , (A.2)
where adjΛ(s) is the adjoint matrix of Λ(s):
adjΛ(s) ≡

 s− δ22 δ12
δ21 s− δ11

 . (A.3)
In order to eliminate the instability originating from the positive (unstable) characteristic
root (λ2 > 0), the jump in consumption at impact (c˜(0)) must correspond to a value such
21
that the numerator of (A.2) equals zero for s = λ2 (at this value of s the denominator is also
zero) [see Judd (1998), pp. 459–460]. This yields the general expression for c˜(0):
adjΛ(λ2)

 c˜(0)−L{γc,λ2}
−L{γk,λ2}

 =

 0
0

 , (A.4)
where we observe that adjΛ(λ2) has rank 1, because λ2 is a distinct eigenvalue of Λ(s).
Hence, either row of (A.4) can be used to compute c˜(0). Using (A.3)–(A.4), we obtain solution
(40) for the initial response of consumption stated in the main text:
c˜(0) = L{γc,λ2}+
δ12
λ2 − δ22
L{γk,λ2} = L{γc,λ2}+
λ2 − δ11
δ21
L{γk,λ2}. (A.5)
A.3 Solution for the Transitional Path of c˜(t) and k˜(t)
To solve explicitly for the transitional paths of consumption and physical capital, we com-
bine (A.2) and (A.4) and find:
(s + λ1)

 L{c˜, s}
L{k˜, s}

 =

 c˜(0)−L{γc, s}
−L{γk, s}


+
1
s− λ2
· adjΛ(λ2)

 L{γc,λ2} − L{γc, s}
L{γk,λ2} − L{γk, s}

 . (A.6)
The relationships (A.5) and (A.6) constitute the general solution in terms of Laplace trans-
forms of the dynamic system (36). As we indicate in section 4.2, we next use the fact that the
Laplace transform disturbance terms correspond to L{γi, s} = γi/s for i = c, k, since shocks
to α˜, η˜, and β˜ are, by assumption, unanticipated, permanent, and time-invariant. Applying
this to (A.6) and rearranging, we obtain the following:
 L{c˜, s}
L{k˜, s}

 =

 c˜(0)
0

 1
s + λ1
+

 c˜(∞)
k˜(∞)

 λ1
s(s + λ1)
. (A.7)
Finally, by inverting (A.7) and notingL{e−λ1t, s} = 1/(s + λ1) andL{1− e
−λ1t, s} = λ1/[s(s +
λ1)], we obtain the solution for
(
c˜ (t) , k˜ (t)
)
given in the main text in equation (41):

 c˜ (t)
k˜ (t)

 =

 c˜(0)
0

 e−λ1t +

 c˜(∞)
k˜(∞)

 [1− e−λ1t] .
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